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Each year, the Indian prime minister announces labor awards to workers
employed in government departments or public sector undertakings. In 2003,
the most prestigious of these was awarded to a team of 5 from the Rail and
Structural Mill of the Bhilai Steel Plant in recognition of their \outstanding
contribution in the eld of productivity".1 The Bhilai Steel Plant (BSP) is
one of the ve integrated steel plants of the Steel Authority of India Limited
(SAIL), the company that has dominated the Indian steel sector since it was
set up in the 1960s. SAIL is largely state-owned with 86 percent of equity and
voting rights held by the Indian government.2 Until the early nineties strict
licensing rules restricted entry into Indian industry and SAIL, and many
other manufacturing companies, survived with limited changes in technology
and negative total factor productivity growth (Katja Schumacher & Jayant
Sathaye 1998).
The industrial liberalization measures introduced in the early 1990s com-
bined with a fall in world steel prices resulted in a series of operating losses
for SAIL. Between 1992 and 2000 the share of the private sector in steel pro-
duction went up from 45 to 68 per cent and the company faced the threat of
its plants being labeled as sick industrial units(Ministry of Steel 1998-2009).
Then began a remarkable revival. Between 1999-2003 SAIL production went
1See http://labour.nic.in/award/shram2003.htm and \Bhilai team bags PM's Shram
Ratna for 2003", SAIL News, June-August 2003, p.18
2www.sail.co.in
1up by 12 percent even though the number of employees went down by 21
percent.3 This process has since continued with record prots in 2008, rising
relative share prices and dividends of over 25 percent for several years.
In this paper we study this revival through the analysis of detailed data
from one part of SAIL, namely the Bhilai Rail and Structural Mill (RSM) in
the Bhilai Steel Plant over the period 1999-2003. The mill has historically
been the sole supplier of rails to the Indian Railways and there exists an
informal understanding that this will continue unless the plant at Bhilai
fails to provide adequate rails of appropriate quality. Over the period we
consider, the plant's orders were threatened for several reasons. First, a
series of train accidents culminating in a major train wreck in 1998 led to
investigations which found sub-standard rails to be a major cause. To lower
accident probabilities, the railways decided to procure longer rails and limit
their hydrogen content. It was initially unclear whether the Bhilai RSM
could provide these and for four months ending April 1999 purchases by the
3SAIL Performance Report, FY 2006 available at www.steel.co.in
2railways were interrupted.4 Second, track replacements and an expansion in
the network led to an accelerated demand for rails and it was suggested that
private players and imports be allowed to supplement the capacity at Bhilai.
Finally, the industrial liberalization measures had already brought private
capital into mid-sized steel plants and these rms were keen to diversify
into larger high-value products with stable demand. SAIL executives and
workers understood that in the absence of signicant quantity and quality
improvements, the market share of the company was severely threatened. 5
Of all the SAIL steel plants, labor productivity went up fastest at the
4The Hindu Business Line for June 8 , 2000 (Calcutta) reports:
The drop in orders, particularly in 1998-99 and 1999-2000, was because of
imports resorted to by the Railways on the plea that BSP was unable to
supply rails as per its specications. While the Railways has been a tradi-
tional buyer of BSP's rails with hydrogen content above three ppm (parts
per million), it revised the specication in recent years and sought rails with
hydrogen content of less than three ppm.
The situation forced SAIL to invest over Rs. 100 crores to equip BSP to
meet the stringent requirement of the Railways for rails with less than three
ppm hydrogen. Four Rail Quality Improvement Schemes were completed by
BSP in 1999-2000.
5Newspaper reports at the time frequently discussed the breaking of SAIL's monopoly
on rails. The Indian Express (June 9, 2000) reports:
Purchases from SAIL were stopped for a brief period of four months following
the accident in Khanna, when the quality of rail was questioned by the
Railway Safety Committee. However, purchases were later resumed in April
1999....
Jindal Steel and Power plans to break SAIL's hold over the huge orders by
manufacturing rail for the domestic market from the next year. The company
will manufacture 78 metre long rail, by acquiring and relocating a rail and
structural mill in South Africa, near Raigarh in MP.
(\Railways to procure Rs 400 cr worth rails from Bhilai Steel" by Jyoti Mukul
)
3Bhilai steel plant over the period 1999-2003. The production of crude steel
per man year went from 121 metric tonnes in 1999-2000 to 129 in the next
scal year and 153 in the year ending March 2003.6The output changes in
the Rail and Structural Mill (RSM) far outstripped changes in the rest of the
plant. In 1999-2000, the Indian railways bought a little over 300 thousand
metric tonnes of rails from the plant. By 2002-2003, procurement was more
than double this amount.7 Although production in the Rail and Structural
Mill, like many other parts of the plant, is continuous, and largely automated,
it relies more heavily on labor than in some of the other departments and
is therefore well suited to a study of changes in productivity that rely on
worker eort. The Bhilai steel plant is part of a township created by SAIL
with subsidized schools and health facilities and is, in this sense, an island
of skilled and highly paid labor in an otherwise poor state of central India.
Both workers and management are unlikely to nd comparable employment
were the plant to close. It is therefore understandable that they had the right
incentives to raise productivity when faced with competition. Our purpose in
this paper is to explore the particular methods through which they achieved
this productivity change.
The dataset that guides us in this eort contains detailed information
on daily operations at the Bhilai RSM. The mill operates continuously with
6Each year, there is a special audit of major public sector undertakings of the Union gov-
ernment. These productivity gures are taken from this audit report for 2004 (Comptroller
and Auditor General of India 2003-2004).
7Based on administrative data provided to us by the Ministry of Railways
43 production shifts per day. We obtained shift-wise data on the number of
steel blooms rolled into rails in each shift, a list of all workers present during
the shift, with their designations, and all delay episodes with their duration
and a description of the cause of the delay. We combine these data on the
production process with administrative data on worker demographics and all
episodes of of training. Even though the overall number of workers did not
change much during the three-year period we consider, the combination of
workers on the 
oor changes from one shift to another; we are able to control
for this variation using worker xed eects.
There is now considerable evidence of total factor productivity (TFP)
dierences across countries and rms. (Robert Hall & Charles Jones 1999)
nd that of the 35-fold dierence in output per worker between the United
States and Niger, TFP dierences explain about twice as much as dierences
in physical and human capital. (Peter Klenow & Chang-Tai Hsieh 2009) use
plant level data from India and China and show that the variance across rms
within these countries is much larger than in the U.S. and the rationalization
of production could raise output by as much as 50 percent. A range of
institutional and policy variables could lie behind these TFP patterns, such
as access to credit, physical and social infrastructure, technological spillovers
and managerial practices.
A recent \bottom-up" approach in economics and management research
tries to uncover particular sources of productivity dierences by modeling
the production process within particular industries. Our study is closely
5related to this work and to a related literature that estimates productivity
responses to greater market competition. (Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw
& Giovanna Prennushi 1997) examine the productivity eects of human re-
source management practices using monthly data for 36 steel nishing lines
across the United States. They nd that workers in plants with traditional
employment contracts and hierarchical supervisory structures are less pro-
ductive than those in rms with innovative practices and that some of these
productivity gains are realized through increased uptime. (Sanghamitra Das
& Ramprasad Sengupta 2007) attribute the productivity increases of blast
furnaces in Indian steel plants to improved coal quality and nd that ad-
ditional managers did not contribute to production unless they were also
trained. (Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen 2007) combine surveys on
management practices with TFP estimates from balance sheet data to ex-
amine the in
uence of such practices on rm productivity. This approach is
in contrast to the traditional one that uses aggregate factors of production
like labor and capital without specifying explicitly what happens inside the
rm.
On the eects of competition, (Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez & James A.
Schmitz, Jr. 2005) show that when the market for steel collapsed in the
early 1980s, countries with iron-ore mines that were close to becoming non-
competitive increased eciency, while others did not. (James A. Schmitz,
Jr. 2005) argues this eciency increase resulted from less restrictive la-
bor contracts which allowed more 
exible allocation of labor time. Other
6work on competition and productivity includes (Douglas W. Caves & Lau-
rits R. Christensen 1980), (Jamie de Melo Tybout, James & Vittorio Corbo
1991), (James R. Tybout & M. Daniel Westbrook 1991), (Stephen J. Nickell
1996), (Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik 1999),(Daniel Tre
er 2004) and
(Shawn Klimek Dunne, Timothy & James A. Schmitz, Jr. 2009). (Chad
Syverson 2010) provides a recent survey of this eld. While we do not have
data on plants not threatened by closure to compare to those that were, we
do have much ner data on a single plant during events that led to increased
competitive pressure. This allows us to focus on the shop 
oor for a ner
investigation of apparent productivity improvements than is usually possible.
Our results attribute most of the observed productivity change to e-
ciency improvements resulting from fewer preventable delays and less pro-
duction downtime. These changes in turn are explained by short and rela-
tively inexpensive bouts of productivity training. Although several programs
of managerial, motivation and technical training were conducted for the mill
workers over this period, the only type of training that appears to have signif-
icant causal eects is training targeted at specically improving rail quality.
An interesting contrast with other studies is that we nd increased uptime
in the absence of any systematic changes in the numbers employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on the steel plant and rail mill at Bhilai. Section 3 describes our data
set. Section 4 uses simple growth accounting identities to decompose output
changes into its component parts, namely changes in rates of production, in
7delays and in the fraction cobbled (the rails that were visually defective dur-
ing the process of rolling before the nal cooling process) and explores the
patterns in each of these.8 Section 5 explicitly models the random processes
resulting in production delays and Section 6 ts these to the data. Section 7
develops some counterfactual experiments to help identify the contribution
of each of a number of factors to productivity and Section 8 summarizes the
lessons learnt and concludes.
2 The Rail and Structural Mill in the Bhilai
Steel Plant
The steel plant at Bhilai covers about 17 square km and and currently em-
ploys about 34,000 workers.9 Until the plant was built in the mid 1950s,
Bhilai was a small and remote village and the plant was located there as
part of a planning strategy to bring jobs to remote areas. With the com-
ing of the plant, Bhilai and 96 of its surrounding villages were transformed
into a company town and the former owners of land were compensated in
part by being given preference in employment. The jobs of regular workers
are secure, with excellent fringe benets including schooling, health care and
housing, travel benets and paid leave. These jobs have always been highly
valued. (Jonathan P. Parry 1999) in his detailed and entertaining account
8Tests to identify defective rails are performed after cooling and so are not in our data.
9(Steel Authority of India 2008).
8of labor conditions and performance at Bhilai refers to workers there as the
aristocracy of labor. He notes that although tasks on the plant can be \ex-
tremely demanding, the amount of the working day spent on them is not."
There was, in the late nineties, a 15-20 percent surplus in manning levels, a
strong correlation between seniority and pay and a very weak one between
pay and performance.10
In spite of this, the Bhilai plant is widely regarded as the most successful
plant in the public sector and perhaps surprisingly, the structure of incen-
tives led to unequal distribution of work and absenteeism rather than low
average eort. In our own eld visits we found groups of extremely commit-
ted workers operating under physical conditions, particularly in the summer
when 
oor temperatures can exceed 50 degrees centigrade in parts of the
plant. In addition, managers seem to put in long hours and pitch in where
needed. Parry noted that although large public industrial units recruited
and organized labor dierently, underutilization was pervasive in many of
these rms. Our ndings on competition and productivity growth in the
state-owned sector may therefore be applicable more broadly.
The Rail and Structural Mill (RSM) is an integral part of the plant. It
was commissioned in 1960 with enough capacity to satisfy domestic demand
at that time. Since then, it has been the sole supplier of rails for Indian
Railways. In addition to producing rails, the mill produces a variety of
dierent products (beams, slabs, channels, angles) that are collectively called
10(Parry 1999, pp. 17-19).
9structurals and are either used directly in major infrastructural projects or
as intermediate inputs into industries producing heavy machinery. Each shift
at the plant is typically devoted to either rails or structurals, with a very few
shifts that are mixed. These mixed shifts are dropped from the data. Table 1
shows the total number of shifts during which only rails and only structurals
were produced for each of the four years of our study. Output during a
structural shift is both sensitive to product type and the production process
is typically more time consuming than that of rails. We therefore restrict our
study productivity changes in the mill to those shifts that produced rails.11
Table 1: RSM shifts worked by year and product type
Year Rails Structurals
April 1999-March 2000 743 279
April 2000-March 2001 754 258
April 2001-March 2002 839 182
April 2002-March 2003 958 79
Source: BSP Operational Statistics, 2003-2004, Table 9.18
Before describing our data in detail, it is useful to brie
y outline the
production technology. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of this process.
In a nutshell, the the main input is a long rectangular block of steel call a
bloom. These are stored in the bloom yard and pass through dierent sections
in a sequential process which converts them into rail tracks. They rst enter
11From discussions with the management we gathered that the product mix is not
primarily driven by price-cost margins. As the mill is the sole supplier for Indian Railways,
they have a mandate to rst meet orders from the Railways. Structurals are more protable
and their prices have been rising but their production depends on the capacity remaining
after the demand for rails has been met.
10one of four furnaces where they are heated. They then move through a series
of work tables in the mill area where they are shaped and then pass to the
hot saw area where they are cut to ordered lengths, stamped and moved to
a cooling bed. Defective or misshapen blooms are referred to as cobbled and
are set aside, the rest are classied as rolled. The mill runs 24 hours a day
7 days a week with very rare shutdowns for service and repairs. Production
workers are rotated among three 8-hour production shifts.
Each worker, at any point in time, has a designation based on their job
description and their seniority. Designations can be usefully divided into
a few groups. Some workers are restricted to a particular location in the
production process while others are not. In the furnace area, the services
team does the recording of blooms, control men move the blooms in and out
of the furnace, while the furnace maintenance team looks after the furnace.
In the mill area, ground sta are on the 
oor of the mill ensuring the smooth

ow of production. The SCM team, a group of senior control men and motor
operators, along with the coggers sit in pulpits and direct the actual rolling
of the rails in this part of the plant. In the hot saw area we have the saw
spell team.
Some groups of workers are not restricted to particular areas of the RSM:
for example, crane operators man cranes that transport blooms at various
stages of production, technicians are responsible for xing mechanical prob-
lems in the dierent machines, while the executives oversee the operation as
a whole.
11Figure 1: The process for rail production in the RSM
The model of production we estimate in Section 6 uses shift-wise data
on the numbers of workers in each of these categories. There are shift-wise
variations in these numbers generated by the number and types of workers
on leave during any particular shift.
Shifts are operated by groups of workers called brigades that remain rel-
atively stable over time. Each worker, at the time of joining the mill is as-
signed to one of these brigades. Brigade membership can be changed based
on worker preferences and decisions of the supervisory and executive sta
but these movements are infrequent. There are more people in a brigade
than typically work in a shift, allowing for weekly days o and other types
of leave. Brigades are rotated weekly across shifts: if a brigade works the
12morning shift in week 1, it is switched to work the afternoon shift for week
2 and and the night shift for week 3.
3 Our data
We have data on a total of 3558 shifts covering the period January 1, 2000 to
March 31, 2003. There are two types of logs kept by the plant for each shift.
The rst of these is a delay report which records of the total input of steel,
total output, the share of defective blooms and the length and cause of each
interruption or delay in the production process. The second log is called the
daily presentee report or the dpr and this records worker attendance. Each
employee is assigned a unique identication number or personal number at
the time they join the company. For each shift, and separately for the furnace
and mill areas, the dpr lists the personal numbers of all workers on the 
oor
during that shift. These two shift-level logs form the core of our data set and
we describe them in some detail below.
During active shifts, the delay report allows us to classify all production
delays into four classes. Outside delays, denoted by us as Do; usually occur
due to events outside the control of the managers and workers in the mill.
These may be unanticipated, as in the case with gas shortages or electrical
faults, or anticipated but unavoidable as in the case of some regular electricity
rationing or an inadequate supply of rail steel. Finishing delays, Df, result
mostly from the cooling bed for nished rails being full and unable to accept
13more rails. This is a downstream constraint that can shut down or slow down
production in the mill. Third, there are planned delays, Dp, which are used
for scheduled maintenance or adjustments of equipment. The fourth class of
delay is the most important one for our analysis; it consists of unplanned and
avoidable delays, Da that result from workers making mistakes. Avoidable
delays are generated as the sum of mechanical, operational and electrical
delays that are classied as avoidable. Although a description of the cause
for each delay is available in the data, it is not possible to locate the source
of all delays on the process chart in Figure 1 and we have no reference to the
person or group at fault. We argue in the following sections that reductions
in avoidable delays made possible notable productivity improvements at the
RSM during the time period of interest.
The delay report sheet is lled in even if there was no production or no
delay during that shift. For example, if there were inadequate orders, the
delay report would record 480 minutes as the delay time and would list no
order as the cause for downtime. There is therefore a delay report for every
shift. We obtained access to paper copies of both delay and attendance logs,
though for a very few shifts these logs were either missing, incomplete or
illegible. In addition, data cleaning led to further attrition. Overall, the
usable data covers about 94 percent of all the shifts in the period.
The attendance log (dpr) provides us with the composition of the work-
force for each shift. The report records the brigade on the 
oor, lists the
workers of the brigade that were present and also the reasons for the absence
14Table 2: Categories of training received, Jan 2000-March 2003




Quality Control 165 9
Cost Reduction 135 7
Safety 131 7
Computer Skills (IT) 61 3
Job Instruction 57 3
Other 151 8
Total 1874 100
Source: Personnel Records, Rail and Structural Mill
of each worker in the brigade but not on the 
oor. We also have the desig-
nation of each worker by shift and can therefore track workers as they move
across brigades, get hired, red or promoted. We combine dpr data from
administrative records on the social background of the personnel, including
their caste aliation and home state. Finally, as mentioned in Section 2, we
have records of all episodes of training undertaken by employees of the mill.
This includes a brief description of the training program, start and end dates
and a list of employees trained.
There was an emphasis on training programs at the plant following the
dismal performance of the company in the late nineties. Workers are trained
both on the 
oor of the mill and in programs organized by the human resource
department. Table 2 classies these programs into nine categories based
roughly on the types of skills that the program targeted.
Although there were a large number of programs, some of them lasted only
15Table 3: The four biggest training programs of RSM employees, Jan 2000-
March 2003
Name of program Dates Category % Training time
Acceptance of rails June 2001 { productivity 22
program { July 2001
ISO-9000 workshop May 2001, quality control 9
March 2002
ISO-14001 workshop Jan 2002, environmental 10
July 2002
Success through Oct 2002 { motivational 24
empowerment of people { Jan 2003
Source: Personnel Records, Rail and Structural Mill
a couple days and involved very few employees. On average, the recipients of
training were less experienced than their peers. This is especially noticeable
for computer skills, cost reduction, safety and motivational training. Some
training was conducted because it helped in obtaining International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO) certication. Most programs did not seem
to target any particular designation; only few of them focused on a narrow
workplace-specic skill. For the most part, training was administered to big
groups of workers rather than to individuals. There were four large programs
which together account for two thirds of total training time over our period.
These are listed in Table 3. In Section 6 we examine the role of dierent
types of training on productivity.
By combining dpr, personnel and training data we can generate shift-wise
data on mean worker characteristics and estimate their eect on productivity.
For example, the dates of training and the list of employees trained allows us
16to generate training stocks for dierent types of training for each employee on
each date and we aggregate this by shift to examine the role of variations in
training on total output. Similarly, we have shift-wise compositions of worker
designations and backgrounds. We know the number of executives, coggers,
control men, ground sta, etc. on the 
oor for each shift, the share of mi-
grant and local workers and their caste composition. (Parry 1999) observed
some tension between the local population of Bhilai and migrants from other
states. Potentially, communal con
icts like this may be strong enough to
impair cooperation at the workplace and decrease productivity. We use both
caste and home state data to account for this possibility. These data allows
us to control for the composition of labor force at much greater detail than
in possible in most studies of productivity. Although the overall composition
of the workforce in the mill changed very little over this period, there is con-
siderable variation in mean characteristics by shift and our strategy exploits
this variation.
We have data available for 9 months of 1999 but ignore these because
the delays logs during this period suggest that the mill was intentionally
operated below full capacity. There were also several accounts in the press
expressing concern by the railways about high hydrogen content of rails from
Bhilai and reports of downtime in the mill frequently record \no order" as a
cause. This problem was resolved in the following year with the installation
of new equipment and orders from the railways went up again. As seen from
the scatter plot in Figure 7, there was a jump in production at the very end
17of 1999. Since our focus is on changes in productivity, we feared these might
be overestimated with the inclusion of data from this 1999.12
4 Decomposition of Output Growth.
In this section we perform a simple decomposition of output growth over our
period. Output is determined by the rate at which blooms are rolled and
uptime. The latter is dened as the total shift time less the delay time in
each of our categories. We then use the time pattern of output and delays
to attribute output changes to changes in delay times for each of the delay
classes. The main dierence between this procedure and commonly observed
decompositions is that we rely on the internal structure of the production
process rather than on totals of raw inputs and the output.
Figure 2 summarizes the dynamics of output change. As seen there, av-
erage output during rail shifts expanded from 158 blooms in the rst quarter
of 2000 to 214 blooms in the rst quarter of 2003, a 35 percent increase.
12 The Hindu Business Line for June 8 , 2000 (Calcutta) reports:
The drop in orders, particularly in 1998-99 and 1999-2000, was because of
imports resorted to by the Railways on the plea that BSP was unable to
supply rails as per its specications. While the Railways has been a tradi-
tional buyer of BSP's rails with hydrogen content above three ppm (parts
per million), it revised the specication in recent years and sought rails with
hydrogen content of less than three ppm.
The situation forced SAIL to invest over Rs. 100 crores to equip BSP to
meet the stringent requirement of the Railways for rails with less than three
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Rail shifts Structural shifts
Figure 2: Blooms rolled for rails and structurals
Proceeding with our decomposition for rail shifts, let Xs denote the total
number of steel blooms used by the brigade on duty during a rail shift s.
Some proportion, ps; of these blooms is successfully rolled into rails, while
the remaining blooms are cobbled and removed from the line as defective.
The nal output is
Ys = psXs
The number of blooms the brigade is able to process is the product of
uptime Ts and rolling rate Rs
13:
Xs = RsTs
Uptime is the total shift time of 480 minutes less time lost because of delays.
13(Das & Sengupta 2007) refer to R and T, as the rate of output the rate of utilization
respectively.
19We denote by Dxs the delay time resulting from a type x delay in shift s.
Uptime is then given by
Ts = 480   Dos   Dps   Dfs   Das
Given uptime and the input of blooms for each shift we infer the processing
rate as Xs=Ts and combine the above equations to obtain:
Ys = psRs(480   Dos   Dps   Dfs   Das) (1)
Using Equation 1, we can attribute output growth in rails to the growth in
6 components: the fraction defective, ps, the rolling rate Rs, and the duration
of the four types delays Dxs.14 By denition, the percentage change in blooms
rolled equals the sum of the percentage change in ps; Rs; and uptime. The















Dividing both sides by dTs
dt , we nd attribute changes in uptime to the
dierent types of delays. Results of this decomposition are shown in the
box contained in Table 4. For example, the contribution of outside delays to
growth in total uptime is
(46:8 31:9)
183 129 = 276  :28
14This is slightly richer than that in the literature. (Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw & Gio-
vanna Prennushi 1997) for example, focus only on the increase in uptime as the major
source of productivity improvements.
20Table 4: The decomposition of output growth into delay components.
Q1 2000 Q1 2003 Growth
p 0:987 0:995 3%
R 0:54 0:614 42%
(480   D) 297 351 55%
Do 46:8 31:9 28%
Dp 90:4 72:5 33%
Df 2:41 2:22 0:35%
Da 43:6 22:7 39%
D 183 129 100%
Y 158 214 100%
According to Table 4, nishing downtime and fraction non-defective do
not seem to be important contributors to output growth. The average frac-
tion of defective blooms fell from 1.3 percent to 0.5 percent over the two-year
period. While this change is signicant the base year value is too low for
it to have much eect on productivity. Outside delays and planned delays
are important sources of output growth, but but are largely exogenous to a
output in a particular shift.15 The remaining variables, the rolling rate R
and avoidable delays, Da, are determined on the mill 
oor and contribute
substantially to the increase in output.
15The way in which workers operate machinery does in
uence the amount of time needed
for its planned maintenance. These delays however, are not necessarily related to the
composition of workers in the particular shift for which output is being measured.
214.1 Delays
A regular shift rarely runs without delays in production. Delays make a
considerable part of a work day; during scal years 2001{2003 they accounted
for 30 percent of an average shift time.
4.1.1 Avoidable delays
Most descriptions of avoidable delays contain one of these keywords: \not
working", \tripped", \fallen", \broken", \jammed", \grinding", \adjust-
ment", \crane down". The avoidable downtime decreased by almost a half,
from 43 minutes per shift in the rst quarter of 2000 to 22 minutes in the
rst quarter of 2003 (Figure 3). The second quarter of 2001 had an unusually
long shutdown in production. According to our information, the time when
the mill stood idle was used for training and equipment replacements. A
training episode to raise productivity in rails termed the \acceptance of rails
program" occurs at this time.16 The decline in delays that followed may thus
have been caused by either training or equipment replacement. However, it
is reasonable to expect, that the better equipment is likely to get broken less
frequently in both rail and structural shifts, which is not observed in the data
(for structurals, the avoidable downtime becomes even higher in Q4 2001).
The training program explicitly focused on raising the output of rails which
is consistent with the observed decrease downtimes during rail shifts, but not
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Rail shifts Structural shifts
Figure 3: Avoidable delays for rails and structurals
structural ones.
4.1.2 Outside Delays
The patterns of outside delays were very dierent for rail and structural shifts
(Figure 4). This is especially noticeable for year 2000, when RSM faced
problems with the supply of low-hydrogen steel. Since hydrogen content is
not as critical for the steel used in heavy structurals, as for rails, there was
less outside downtime during structural shifts.
More than 60 percent of outside delays were associated with insucient
supply of inputs (keywords \shortage", \voltage", \restriction") or their bad










































2000q1 2001q1 2002q1 2003q1
quarter
Rail shifts Structural shifts
Figure 4: Outside delays
4.1.3 Planned Delays
After an initial drop in 2000, planned downtime has been slowly increasing
until mid-2002 (Figure 5). We interpret this increase as a natural conse-
quence of higher capital utilization. As output per shift grows over time, the
equipment requires more frequent service. We did not observe any qualita-
tive dierence between rail and structural shifts which is consistent with this
interpretation.
The descriptions of delay causes suggest that planned delays were primar-
ily used for regular maintenance. More than 90 percent of planned delays
were associated with \checking", \adjustment" and \changing" of \section",















































2000q1 2001q1 2002q1 2003q1
quarter
Rail shifts Structural shifts
Figure 5: Planned delays
4.1.4 Finishing Delays
Finishing delays were only around 5{6 minutes per shift in 2000{2003 (Figure
6). Consequently, nishing downtime changes do not contribute much to out-
put growth per se. They serve as a source of information about downstream
bottlenecks that may restrict the productivity of the mill.
Finishing delays occur at the nal phase of production { when the rails
are coming from the Hot Saw section to the cooling bed. There is only one
cause listed for all nishing delays: \cooling bed full". If there is not sucient









































2000q1 2001q1 2002q1 2003q1
quarter
Rail shifts Structural shifts
Figure 6: Finishing delays
4.2 Rolling Rates
Figure 7 plots the rolling rate over time. It includes both heavy structurals
and rails.
It is evident from this gure that the rates seem to switch between discrete
regimes. The switching clearly occurs at least three times: on September 15th
1999, November 7th 2000 and September 4th 2002. Within each regime the
rates are dispersed around some average level that is stable over time which
makes sense as dispersion will naturally arise in day to day operations.
Before September 1999, the mill had few orders as it was deemed inca-
pable of producing the required quality. As a result, it was operating far
below capacity. It is recorded that one furnace out of four was running be-
tween Sept. 1999 and November 1999, consistent with the low average rolling
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Figure 7: Rolling rates for rails and structurals, 1999-2003
After this rst switch, between September 1999 and November 2000, there
is a period where rolling rates 
uctuated from one level to another. In this
period the mill had limited access to low hydrogen steel from outside. There
are two ways of reducing the hydrogen content in the rails. One is to use
a degasser to make better steel. The other is to accept steel with a high
hydrogen content but to cool the rail slowly allowing hydrogen to escape (see
(Abhai Kumar Rai & Atul Agarwal 2007)). The Bhilai Plant installed a
degasser in early 2000.17 It took six months or so to get consistent operation
of this unit and until October of 2000, it was not fully eective. Note the
high level of outside delays around the rst switch (due to the lack of good
steel) and high nishing delays afterwards (due to slow cooling) as depicted
17It is recorded that the degasser was put in for hot trials in March 2000 (Hindu Business
Line Newspaper, June 9th 2000.) The degasser was eective October 1st 2000, as recorded
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Figure 8: Outside and nishing delays, 1999-2001.
After November 2000, the degasser was running consistently and this is
re
ected in the higher more stable rate pattern.19 Finally, the regime switch
that took place on September 4th 2002 is explained by the installation of
some new equipment. We identify this using delay cause descriptions. On
exactly September 4th a new delay cause started appearing in the data; it is
listed as \jamming at new descaling unit". This delay occurred nine times in
the rst three days following the regime switching. Gradually, its frequency
declined to ve occurrences per quarter. Since the increase in the rolling
18For this reason, the RSM moved its output towards structurals in this period (where
the hydrogen content was less of an issue) as far as possible. When it was forced to make
rails, it did so, but could only use the slow cooling method as good steel was hard to come
by. For this reason, before 2000, even when the share of rails was high, the output of rails
was quite low.
19The degasser was installed in early 2000, started being tested in March, but did not
function eectively until later in the year ((Hindu Business Line Newspaper, June 9th
2000, (Comptroller and Auditor General of India 2003-2004))
28rate occurred simultaneously with the installation of the new equipment, we
conclude that the former was likely to be caused by the latter.
Overall, it seems fair to say that the long run dynamics of the rolling
rate seem to be determined by technological considerations and the outside
constraints operating.
5 A Semi Structural Model of Production
We build a stylized model of the mill in which each bloom goes through
a sequence of dierent stages before being nished. At each stage in the
production process, either events outside the control of the brigade may occur
or workers on the 
oor may make mistakes. These events and mistakes result
in delays. The duration of delays may depend on the worker characteristics
during the shift. We choose what we believe are reasonable distributions for
delay times caused by these events and then estimate the parameters of these
distributions. Finally, we discuss some alternative modeling approaches and
justify the choice of the assumptions made in our model.
Each bloom goes through the following sequence of events and delays. We
denote events and mistakes by Mx and delays by Dx, where x 2 fo;p;a;fg
refers to the type of delay (outside, planned, avoidable and nishing).
1. A steel bloom is fed into the furnace area for reheating.
2. An outside event may occur at this point. If the event occurs, it triggers
an outside delay of Do minutes. Do is drawn from the distribution
29Fo(DojZ) where Z refers to the relevant characteristics of workers on
the 
oor. We therefore assume that while the event is independent
of the workers on the 
oor, the delay duration does depends on these
characteristics because the events often require intervention by the mill
personnel. In the absence of the event, there is no outside delay. 20
3. Next, workers may make an avoidable mistake causing an avoidable
delay of Da minutes before production is restored. Da is sampled from
Fa(DajZ). In this case both the probability of the mistake and the
delay time depends on Z.
4. To roll the bloom into a nal product, it takes time t where t = 1=R
and R is the rolling rate.
5. When the bloom is rolled, there is some chance of the cooling bed being
full, resulting in a nishing delay of Df minutes drawn from Ff(Df).
This is unlikely to depend on Z, since it is a downstream delay and
mill personnel are not involved in clearing the cooling bed.
6. With probability p the nal product is non-defective.
7. With some probability (which varies by quarter) the equipment requires
maintenance and Dp minutes are spent in a planned delay, where Dp
is drawn from Fp(DpjZ).
20For example, 
ooding in the rainy season requires drainage of the aected area before
production can be resumed and 
uctuations in electrical voltage or broken equipment may
have to be reported.
308. The process is repeated starting from step 1.
For outside, planned and nishing delays, we assume that the events caus-
ing the delays are beyond the control of the mill workers. They occur with
some exogenous probability that we allow to vary by the calendar quarter
during which production takes place. Avoidable delays on the other hand are
caused by worker mistakes which are allowed to depend on the composition
of workers on the shift.
In each case, we use a logit model to approximate the process generating
the event. For a shift with worker characteristics Z , the probability of
avoidable mistakes is given by




and for all other delay types the probability of events causing the delay in
calendar quarter q is
PrfMx = 1jqg =
1
1 + e x(q)
If a delay occurs, we model the duration of delays that follow by gamma
distributions. Each delay Dx is a drawn from a gamma distribution  (x;)
where x = xZ is the shape parameter and x is the scale parameter (always
independent of worker characteristics) for x 2 fo;p;ag. The density function
for delay durations of these three types is therefore










; x = a;o;p:
We assume that Ff(Df) takes a similar gamma form but with the addi-
tional restriction that the shape parameter is not dependent on Z though it
is allowed to vary by quarter. Thus








Recall that the mean of the gamma distribution is given by 0Z, while
the variance is 20Z. Thus, our parametrization allows both the mean and
the variance of avoidable, outside and planned delays to depend on who is
on the 
oor. For nishing delays, it allows the mean and variance to vary by
quarter only.
We chose the gamma distribution for its 
exibility and as it ts the data
quite well. In Figure 5 we compare our tted gamma distributions with his-
tograms based on the actual data and nd the approximation to be very close.
This parameterization also allows for a simple interpretation of the estimates.
Assume the observed delay durations come from the sum of delays caused by
each individual on the 
oor and that these individually generated delays are
independently generated. Then if the delays of a single worker come from
the gamma distribution  (i;) where i is an individual characteristic of
worker i, by gamma-additivity, total delays are distributed as  (ii;). Our
formulation is therefore consistent with, though not restricted by, a model in
32which todays delays are the sum of delays caused by individual workers and
individual delays in turn depend on the characteristics of the worker.21
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Figure 9: Gamma distribution approximations to observed delay durations
We estimate the probability of delays of various forms by applying the
logit model to the sample of all rolled blooms. To keep our estimation






N + ui where Zi contains
worker-specic characteristics from Z, Y contains common characteristics, and ui is










N + ui) =

1 [number of workers by designation, training by type]+
0
2Y+full set of xed eects =
0Z. For the model without worker xed-eects, omit ui from the above derivation. Tables
5 and 6 in the next section present estimates of the model with and without worker xed
eects.
33tractable, we assume that all random processes in the model (Mx, Dx) are
jointly independent conditional on Z. The only permissible correlation be-
tween outside, avoidable and planned delays must therefore go through the
brigade on the 
oor. This assumption allows avoidable, outside and planned
delays to be estimated independently of each other. We estimate x and x
independently for avoidable, outside, planned and nishing delays by apply-
ing the method of maximum likelihood to the sub-sample of blooms with
positive delay durations, Dx. It is well known that this likelihood function
is concave and so has a unique maximum. (S. C. Choi & R. Wette 1969).
6 Estimation
We begin by describing the construction of variables that comprise the shift-
wise characteristics of workers Z in our model. These include the number
of workers, disaggregated by their designation, diversity indices based on
hometown and caste and training stocks by nine training categories.
The technological process is organized around ten groups of workers. As
shown in Figure 1, there are seven teams of workers. In addition, there are
three groups ( Executives, Crane operators and Technicians) who may appear
at any stage of the process. Since dierent groups perform dierent tasks,
we treat them as separate types of labor and construct ten labor variables
for the shift-wise numbers in each of these groups.
Worker diversity may aect cooperation among workers within a shift.
34We use two indices to capture dierent dimensions of diversity, home state
and caste aliation. These are constructed as follows:
local mix = min(slocal;1   slocal);
caste mix = min(sscst;1   sscst);
where slocal is the share of shift workers originating from the local area around
Bhilai and sscst is the share of workers from the Scheduled Castes and Sched-
uled Tribes, the two groups that declared as disadvantaged by the Indian
state and are entitled to armative action benets.
To examine the eects of training, we construct training stocks for the
nine categories in Table 2 for each worker on each date. So, for example,
the total stock of safety training for worker w at any date equals the total
number of days of such training administered to him by that date. We
aggregate individual stocks for all workers on the attendance sheet for that
shift to construct our nine stocks for every shift.
The model is estimated on the sample of shifts producing only rails during
the period January 1, 2000-March 31, 2003. Table 5 presents our results. All
estimates are presented as \average marginal eects". For example, the eect
of productivity training on the probability of an avoidable delay occurring
has a marginal eect of -0.33. Recall that our estimates are scaled up by
10,000. This means that on average, an extra day of this training reduces
the probability of a mistake on a single bloom by .000033 and with roughly
35200 blooms a shift, by 0.66 percent a shift.
Column 1 of the table contains logit estimates based on the sample of all
418,819 blooms rolled over this period. If an avoidable delay occurs during
a shift, we set Ma = 1 for the rst bloom in that shift. For each subsequent
avoidable delay on that shift, we assign that delay to subsequent blooms
in that same shift. If, say, four avoidable delay episodes occur during that
shift, Ma = 1 for the rst four blooms of that shift. Given that the worker
characteristics are the same for all blooms rolled in the shift and delays are
assumed to be independent, all assignments of delays to blooms have equal
probability and the way in which delays are assigned to particular blooms
does not aect our estimates.
Columns 2-4 contain maximum likelihood estimates based on the gamma
distributions described above and the number of observations is therefore
the number all delay episodes during this period for each type of delay. The
dependent variable is the amount of delay time, in minutes. There are there-
fore as many observations per shift as delay episodes of the category that is
being explained.
The estimates are consistent with the presence of over stang. Note that
in column 1 of Table 5 whenever the coecient on the number of workers on
the 
oor of a given type is signicant, it is positive, indicating a higher prob-
ability of a mistake. The estimates on the determinants of delay durations
in columns 2-4 also provide no clear evidence that the mistakes are xed
faster by larger brigades. Hence, a increase in the quantity of labor hired, all
36else equal, is unlikely to reduce downtime and raise output per shift. These
results are supported by the anecdotal evidence on over stang at the BSP
given in (Parry 1999).
Some types of training do seem to reduce avoidable mistakes as seen
by the negative coecients on environmental, motivational and productivity
training. However we show below that of these, only productivity training
seems to be robust to changes in model specication. We also nd no evidence
that caste diversity impairs productivity; if anything, workers in shifts that
are heterogeneous in terms of caste seem to make fewer mistakes.
Total labor variables alone might not be able to capture all the relevant
dynamics in workforce composition. When using aggregate numbers for dif-
ferent designations and training stocks, we implicitly assume that replacing
one worker with another will not change the outcome as long as the work-
ers' training stocks, etc., are the same. If this is not the case, our estimates
may be subject to the omitted variable bias. To check the robustness of the
estimates in 5, we augment Z by individual worker dummies and reestimate
these equations.
The estimates presented in Table 6 conrm our main result: productivity
training signicantly reduces downtime. In addition motivational training
seems to reduce the average time spent in planned delays. The coecient of
job instruction training is now positive. This could be because job instruc-
tion occurs when new workers are hired or promoted. To check for this, we
controlled for time in the job by putting in a novice dummy for those on the
37job less than six months (these estimates are available on request), but this
had no eect on estimates. Caste diversity is no longer signicant. Thus, the
only robust result is that productivity training helps.
To quantify and better illustrate the total eect of such training on out-
put, we perform a a set of counterfactual simulations in the following section
where the stocks of such training and other possibly relevant explanatory
variables are varied and the dynamics of simulated output are compared
with observed output.
7 Counterfactual Experiments
In this section we use the estimates from the above section to study the
impact of counterfactual changes in labor, diversity and the stock of training
on the overall output. To avoid omitted variable bias, we restrict ourselves
to the model with individual xed eects and use the estimates from Table
6.
We simulate production bloom by bloom, following the multi step proce-
dure outlined in Section 5. In each of our counterfactual experiments, the set
of brigade characteristics is split in two parts: Z = [Z1;Z2]. The rst part
contains variables that we freeze at the level of quarter 1, 2000 in the simu-
lation. The second consists of characteristics that are allowed to change over
time as observed in the data. This way, we predict the time path of output
that would occur, had the management chosen not to adjust the variables
38in Z1. By varying the composition of Z1 and Z2 from one simulation to the
next, we sequentially examine the importance of dierent sets of explanatory
variables.
Each bloom that enters the mill takes time 1=R to be processed if no
mistakes or delays occur. If the model generates the event that a draw from
a delay distribution is warranted, then the delay drawn is added to this time.
Many delays may occur and these are additively incorporated. There is a
probability, which varies by calendar quarter, that the bloom may be cobbled,
in which case the simulation will throw this bloom out. This continues until
the 480 minutes of the shift are over. At the end of each shift, the total
blooms rolled are generated. We take the monthly output generated by the
simulation and label this to be the simulated output.
We start with simulating a full model in which Z2 contains all the covari-
ates and Z1 is empty. We then shrink the list of variables in Z2 in stages and
observe the response of simulated output. The results of these experiments
are depicted in Figure 7.
Panel (a) shows that the full model ts the monthly output data very
well. Recall from Section 5 that so as not to over parametrize the model, we
only allow for quarterly changes in the probabilities of outside, planned and
nishing delays. As a result, if outside delays, for example, are frequent in a
particular week or month, the model will not take this into account and will
tend to overestimate output for that month. This is why the model does not
track the data spike by spike, but it does track it well on average.
39In panel (b), we assume that the diversity indices are kept at their average
level in the rst quarter of 2000. By comparing simulated output here with
that in panel (a), we see that this restriction does very little to estimated
output: therefore we can say that the eect of changing diversity is very
small.
In the next panel, we impose restrictions on an additional set of variables:
the total labor in each team and all worker dummies. This does not allow
the management to control the composition of the workforce at all. The 
uc-
tuations in output are now driven only by training stocks and the quarterly
dummies. This causes a model to slightly under predict output starting early
2002. Since these predictions are not systematically outside the condence
bands, we can say that changes in these labor related variables were not the
primary determinants of output growth. In the RSM, total labor used did
not change by much in this period and none of these coecients is signicant
so it is not not surprising that the change that did occur has little impact.
Panel (d) shows what output would be produced if no changes in diversity
or labor composition were allowed and only the \productivity" training was
administered to the workers. This way, we shut down the eects of all training
that does not belong to the productivity category. Although the latter is the
only covariate not frozen in time, the model still ts the data quite well
suggesting that this other training was pretty useless. There is an over-
prediction in the rst and second quarter of 2001 in panel (d), but the t is
good in later periods.
40Finally, in panel (e) we x all covariates at their level of their average
value in the rst quarter of 2001. The predicted time path of output is
driven by the outside factors only, such as outside mistakes and variations
in the processing rate. We now see a large discrepancy between prediction
and the actual data. The last two panels suggest that productivity training
was crucial in increasing output. Had management done nothing to train
the employees, the growth in output would have been much more modest.
The gap between simulated and actual output starts in the summer of 2001,
which is precisely when the largest productivity training program took place
(see Table 3).
8 Conclusions
We attempt to explain output growth in state-owned industry based on a
proprietary dataset that documents 
oor-level operations at Bhilai Rail and
Structural Mill, a unit of Steel Authority of India. During the three year
period we consider, output increased by about a third in response to external
pressures. Changes if the rolling account for 42 percent of this, while a fall
in delay episodes and durations accounts for about 55 percent. Delays that
are classied as avoidable by management in turn account for 39 percent of
the time saved by fewer and shorter delays.
We then present and estimate a simple model of production that goes
beyond the traditional production function approach and exploits the struc-
41ture of the technological process. Our estimated model allows us to turn
on and o various channels through which production could have increased.
By conducting such counterfactual experiments, we show, for example, that
most of the growth in production that came from reductions in avoidable
delays occurred due to a single training episode during which workers were
trained on raising rail quality.22
We see the contribution of this paper as both methodological and empir-
ical. The model that we propose is not specic to the steel industry. It may
be applied to any production unit involved in a processing task of an arbi-
trary nature. Since many manufacturing rms are organized around tasks in
established technological chains, our approach is most likely to be useful in
the manufacturing sector.
By considering a rm in which aggregate labor adjustments were not pos-
sible, we highlight the role of other margins of productivity improvements,
namely training and, to use Leibenstein's phrase, the existence of X-eciency
which made these changes possible.23 The phase following industrial liber-
alization in India has seen a great diversity of experience with state-owned
industry. While some industries, such as the state-owned airlines, have found
it dicult to compete with private entrants, others like steel, heavy indus-
try, telephone companies and state-owned banks have survived and, in some
cases, increased their market share in response to competition.
22Training episodes were by and large low cost operations as they were implemented at
times when the mill was to be closed anyway.
23(Harvey Leibenstein 1966)
42The co-existence of state and private ownership within narrowly dened
industries is intriguing given the dierences in managerial practices, labor
tenure systems and wage structures observed across the two forms of owner-
ship. The changes we observed in Bhilai did not occur until workers perceived
their jobs under threat. It may well be that the combination of job security
and high wages that were associated with low productivity before industrial
liberalization created the potential for the dramatic response that followed
it.
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46Table 5: Estimates of downtime components
Dependent variable Ma Da Do Dp
Worker Teams (# workers)
Control Men 1.91y -1.90 -9.65 4.77
Coggers -0.86 -2.53 12.3 3.99
Crane Operators -0.19 2.55 35.6 -2.27
Executives -3.63 -4.87 9.19 -12.8
Furnace Maintenance -0.32 -1.31 -21 -1.63
Ground Sta 1.23y 3.31y 5.82 -0.31
Senior Control Men 1.76 -4.31y -11.3 -1.12
Services 2.17y 0.22 -10.1 -0.99
Saw Spell 0.45 -1.06 -9.16 0.21
Technicians 5.67 -2.13 8.33 8.05
Training stocks (days)
Cost Reduction 0.34 -0.04 -3.12 0.18
Environmental -0.53 0.06 -0.73 -0.72
IT 0.18 -1.20 3.03 0.29
Job Instruction -0.27 1.30 0.73 1.75
Motivational -0.12 0.17 0.70 -0.12
Productivity -0.33 -0.13 -1.07y -0.08
Quality Control -0.08 -0.15 -2.04 -0.17
Safety -0.05 0.86 11.9 0.89
Other -0.33 -1.08 -0.14 0.79
Caste mix -146 -108 -261 -185
Local mix 23 -75 -367 156
Observations 418,819 3,366 1,788 5,219
Signicance levels : y: 10 percent  : 5 percent  : 1 percent
Column 1 reports average marginal eects on PrfMa = 1g, scaled up by 10,000
Columns 2-4 report marginal eects on delay durations,scaled up by 10
Unlisted control variables: brigade dummies
47Table 6: Estimates of downtime components (with worker dummies)
Dependent variable Ma Da Do Dp
Worker Teams (# workers)
Control Men 29.2 -3.15 -83.3 12.9
Coggers 20.4 -3.59 17 12.5
Crane Operators -21.7 52.2 58.1 12.1
Executives -1.25 4.73 -11.5 -22.5
Furnace Maintenance 17.4 -23 -193 38.5
Ground Sta 15.5 18.4 -123 14.5
Senior Control Men 28 -1.80 -127 8.74
Services 26.5 27.1 -96 21.6
Saw Spell 14.1 25.2 -132 3.09
Technicians -8.75 -15.9 201 -46.4
Training stocks (days)
Cost Reduction -0.67 2.11 4.18 -2.85
Environmental -0.04 -0.75 -0.75 -0.95
IT -0.32 0.26 21.5 2.62
Job Instruction 4.76 4.63 -29.6 5.63
Motivational 0.07 -0.21 0.48 -0.60
Productivity -0.41 -0.43 -1.88 -0.09
Quality Control -0.22 -0.99 -1.64 -0.47
Safety 0.32 2.88 9.99 0.30
Other -0.33 0.45 -3.83 1.07
Caste mix -427 -926 -2638 34.1
Local mix 11.2 -50 474 118
The number of observations are the same as in Table 5.
Signicance levels : y: 10 percent  : 5 percent  : 1 percent
Column 1 reports average marginal eects on PrfMa = 1g, scaled up by 10,000
Columns 2-4 report marginal eects on delay durations, scaled up by 10
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(e) Freeze all covariates: Z2 = []
Figure 10: Diversity, labor and training, and their overall eects on output
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